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While some delay and disruption may occur as a result of the
implementation of CPL § 190.52,86 the experience of another state
with a similar statute suggests that the existence of a right to coun-
sel will not effect a dramatic alteration in the grand jury process in
New York.' 7 In the final analysis, the amendments represent a re-
sponsive effort on the part of the legislature to revitalize the grand
jury system.'8 In light of the potential for procedural problems,
however, it is suggested that the courts should monitor the effects
of the amendment to ensure that it operates in the manner intended
by the legislature.
Leah Kaplan
Court of Appeals sanctions warrentless arrest based on probable
cause
It is well established that a warrantless "street arrest" does not
violate the fourth amendment proscription against unreasonable
searches and seizures' 9 if the arresting officer has reasonable cause
or where an attorney accompanies his client to a police lineup. Naftalis, Need for Representa-
tion at Grand Jury Inquiries, Nat'l L.J., Oct. 2, 1978, at 19, col. 3, 47, col. 4.
"I8 In testifying before a congressional committee, Charles Ruff, the last Watergate spe-
cial prosecutor stated:
[T]he mere possibility of occasional disruption simply cannot overcome the right
of the individual witness to consult his attorney without going through the mildly
absurd process of leaving the grand jury room every time. Indeed, most prosecutors
would admit . . . that they count on the burden of leaving the room to dissuade
the witness from asserting his right to counsel.
Quoted in Gerstein & Robinson, Remedy for the Grand Jury: Retain but Reform, 64 A.B.A.J.
337, 339 (1978).
I Although the analogous Massachusetts statute, MAss. ANN. LAWS ch. 277, § 14A
(1977), has no provision for the expulsion of "unruly counsel" it appears that the grand jury
process in Massachusetts remains essentially unaffected. See Burke, supra note 156, at 2, col.
1.
1 It is interesting to note that when Governor Carey vetoed an identical grand jury
reform bill in 1975 he stated that the witness' right to confer with counsel outside the grand
jury room rendered the proposed procedural change unnecessary. Governor's Disapproval
Memorandum No. 118 (1975), reprinted in [1975] N.Y. Legislative Index 478. Upon approv-
ing the 1978 bill, however, Governor Carey observed that it was needed to ensure fairness and
"encourage confidence in the grand jury system." Governor's Memorandum on Approval of
ch. 447, N.Y. Laws (June 19, 1978), reprinted in [1978] N.Y. Laws A-285, 286.
..6 U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrant
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation and particu-
larly describing the place to be searched, and the person to be seized.
In Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961), the Supreme Court held the prohibitions of the fourth
amendment applicable to the states through the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
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to believe that the suspect has committed a felony.1Y0 Until recently,
however, it remained uncertain whether the police could effect a
warrantless arrest in a suspect's home in the absence of exigent
circumstances.'71 In People v. Payton,7 2 the Court of Appeals re-
solved this question by holding that the fourth amendment does not
prohibit the police from entering a suspect's home to make a war-
rantless felony arrest based on probable cause.7 3
The Payton Court consolidated the appeals of two defendants
who challenged the admission of evidence at their trials which was
110 United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 417 (1976); People v. De Bour, 40 N.Y.2d 210,
352 N.E.2d 562, 386 N.Y.S.2d 375 (1976); People v. Schneider, 58 App. Div. 2d 817, 396
N.Y.S.2d 272 (2d Dep't 1977); People v. Stroller, 53 App. Div. 2d 816, 385 N.Y.S.2d 292 (1st
Dep't 1976); see CPL § 140.10 (1971).
,"I See United States v. Watson, 423 U.S. 411, 418 n.6 (1976); Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S.
103, 113 n.13 (1975). Some commentators view Watson as an indication that warrantless
felony arrests in the home are permissible. Comment, Forcible Entry To Effect A Warrantless
Arrest-The Eroding Protection Of The Castle, 82 DicK. L. Rav. 167, 185 (1977); Note,
Watson and Santana: Death Knell For Arrest Warrants?, 28 SYRACUSE L. Rav. 787, 788 (1977).
Watson, however, involved an arrest in a public place, and the Supreme Court did not
squarely address the question whether a warrantless arrest in a private home would be valid
absent extenuating circumstances. 423 U.S. at 418 n.6. See generally Comment, Watson and
Ramey: The Balance of Interests In Non-Exigent Felony Arrests, 13 SAN DIEGo L. REv. 838
(1976); 14 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 193 (1976). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit recently
held that a warrantless arrest in a suspect's home is unlawful absent exigent circumstances.
United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412 (2d Cir. 1978); accord United States v. Killebrew, 560
F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1977).
It is clear that the police need not secure a warrant to enter forcibly and arrest a suspect
in his home if "exigent circumstances" exist. E.g., People v. Richardson, 36 App. Div. 2d 603,
318 N.Y.S.2d 891 (1st Dep't), aff'd mem., 29 N.Y.2d 802, 277 N.E.2d 412, 327 N.Y.S.2d 364
(1971); People v. McIlwain, 28 App. Div. 2d 711, 281 N.Y.S.2d 218 (2d Dep't 1967) (mem.).
Factors often used to determine whether these circumstances do exist include:
(1) the gravity or violent nature of the offense with which the suspect is to be
charged; (2) whether the suspect "is reasonably believed to be armed"; (3) "a clear
showing of probable cause. . . to believe that the suspect committed the crime";
(4) "strong reason to believe that the suspect is in the premises being entered"; (5)
"a likelihood that the suspect will escape if not swiftly apprehended"; and (6) the
peaceful circumstances of the entry.
United States v. Reed, 572 F.2d 412, 424 (2d Cir. 1978) (quoting Dorman v. United States,
435 F.2d 385, 392-93 (D.C. Cir. 1970)); see United States v. Jarvis, 560 F.2d 494, 498 (2d Cir.
1977); CPL §§ 120.80(4), 140.15(4) (1971).
172 45 N.Y.2d 300, 380 N.E.2d 224, 408 N.Y.S.2d 395 (1978), aff'g 56 App. Div. 2d 937,
392 N.Y.S.2d 848 (2d Dep't) (mem.), and 55 App. Div. 2d 859 (1st Dep't 1976) (mem.), aff'g
84 Misc. 2d 973, 376 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1974).
113 45 N.Y.2d at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 225, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 396. See People v. Smith, 31
App. Div. 2d 863, 297 N.Y.S.2d 225 (3d Dep't 1969); People v. Kisin, 28 App. Div. 2d 654,
280 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1st Dep't 1967); CPL § 140.10 (1971); note 169 supra. With respect to the
criteria used by the courts in evaluating whether "probable cause" exists, see People v. Oden,
36 N.Y.2d 382, 329 N.E.2d 188, 368 N.Y.S.2d 508 (1975); People v. Wharton, 60 App. Div.
2d 291, 400 N.Y.S.2d 840 (2d Dep't 1977).
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obtained when the police entered their homes to effect an arrest. 74
In defendant Payton's case, the police went to the suspect's home
after two eyewitnesses identified him as the man who had killed a
service station manager during the course of a robbery.'75 After no
one answered in response to their knock,'76 the police forcibly en-
tered and found a rifle shell casing lying in plain view.' 7  Similarly,
in the case of defendant Riddick, the police found narcotics in the
suspect's home after entering for the purpose of arresting him for
armed robbery. 78 In both cases, the defendant moved to suppress
the incriminating evidence, arguing that the arrests were unlawful
since the police had ample opportunity to secure warrants but had
failed to do so.179 The motions were denied'0 and both defendants
"1, 45 N.Y.2d at 305-07, 380 N.E.2d at 225-27, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 396-98.
Id. at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
,75 Id. The police heard a stereo playing and saw a light shining in Payton's apartment.
When no one responded to their knock, the officers summoned the Emergency Services
Department and the door was forced open 1/2 hour later. Id. at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408
N.Y.S.2d at 396-97.
'- Id. at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397; see note 180 infra. After noticing
the shell casing, the police searched the entire apartment and found a shotgun, ammunition,
a sales receipt for a rifle and an incriminating photograph. Payton surrendered to the police
the next day. 45 N.Y.2d at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397.
"1 45 N.Y.2d at 307, 380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 398. In June of 1973, the
defendant Riddick was identified as the perpetrator of two 1971 armed robberies. Although
the police ascertained the suspect's address after a 6-month investigation, they waited until
Mar. 14, 1974 before making the arrest. Id., 380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397-98. While
waiting for Riddick to dress after the arrest had been made, a detective searched a chest of
drawers next to the defendant's bed and found narcotics and a hypodermic syringe. Id.
"I' Id. at 308, 380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 398. In the case of the defendant Payton,
the police waited until the morning after the suspect was identified before attempting to
apprehend him. Moreover, after they arrived at the defendant's apartment, the police had
enough time to contact the Emergency Services Department and wait an additional /2 hour
for their arrival. Id. at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 396-97. Similarly, in de-
fendant Riddick's case, the police waited 2 months before effecting an arrest. Id. at 307,
380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 398.
'0 Id. at 305-06, 308, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 227, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 397, 398. In defendant
Payton's case, the lower court found that the police were lawfully in the suspect's apartment,
despite the absence of an arrest warrant. The court also concluded that the shell casing, which
was inadvertently observed in "plain view," was admissible evidence. Id. at 306, 380 N.E.2d
at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397; see Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234, 236 (1967) (per
curiam); People v. Boone, 41 App. Div. 2d 783, 341 N.Y.S.2d 41 (3d Dep't 1973) (mem.);
People v. Velez, 88 Misc. 2d 378, 392, 388 N.Y.S.2d 519, 529 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1975).
The other objects, which included a shotgun, had been discovered only after a full-scale
search, see note 177 supra, and were suppressed on concession of the prosecution. 45 N.Y.2d
at 305-06, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397. The trial court, however, permitted
testimony from a gun shop owner who had been traced through a receipt found during the
search. The defendant's contention that this testimony should have been excluded as the fruit
of an unlawful search was rejected, since, in the lower court's view, the police would have
located the witnesses through ordinary investigative practices. Id. at 313-14, 380 N.E.2d at
231, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 402; see People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 300 N.E.2d 139, 346
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subsequently were convicted.181 The appellate division affirmed. 182
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions, find-
ing that exigent circumstances are not a necessary predicate for
effecting a warrantless arrest within a suspect's home.' Writing for
the majority,8 ' Judge Jones distinguished arrests without warrants
from warrantless searches, reasoning that entering a home to make
an arrest represents a lesser "incursion on the householder's do-
main" than entering to conduct a search of the premises. 1' While
warrantless searches are unreasonable per se absent extentuating
circumstances, Judge Jones perceived no ground for applying the
stringent requirements governing searches to cases involving in-
home arrests.' Instead, personal seizure within a private residence
was viewed to be analogous to an arrest effected in a public place
N.Y.S.2d 793, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1050 (1973); People v. Sciacca, 57 App. Div. 2d 846, 393
N.Y.S.2d 999 (2d Dep't 1977) (mem.); People v. McLaughlin, 48 App. Div. 2d 722, 367
N.Y.S.2d 362 (3d Dep't 1975). See generally Maguire, How To Unpoison The Fruit-The
Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rules, 55 J. CraM. L.C. & P.S., 307 (1964); Pitler,
"The Fruit of the Poisonous Tree" Revisited and Shepardized, 56 CALIn. L. Rav. 579 (1968).
In defendant Riddick's case, the lower court found that the narcotics were uncovered in a
search incident to a lawful arrest and therefore were admissible at trial. 45 N.Y.2d at 308,
380 N.E.2d at 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 398; see Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); People
v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y. 2d 351, 320 N.E.2d 636, 361 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1974); People v. Lewis, 26
N.Y.2d 547, 260 N.E.2d 538, 311 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1970); People v. Merola, 30 App. Div. 2d 963,
294 N.Y.S.2d 301 (2d Dep't 1968) (mem.).
"1 45 N.Y.2d at 306, 308, 380 N.E.2d at 226, 227, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 397, 398. Defendant
Payton was tried and found guilty. Defendant Riddick, on the other hand, pled guilty to a
reduced charge after his suppression motion was denied.
In 56 App. Div. 2d at 938; 55 App. Div. 2d at 859.
In 45 N.Y.2d at 305, 380 N.E.2d at 225, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
I" Judge Jones was joined in his majority opinion by Chief Judge Breitel and Judges
Jasen and Gabrielli. Judges Wachtler, Fuchsberg, and Cooke dissented in separate opinions.
i" 45 N.Y.2d at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
"I Id. Generally, warrantless searches are unreasonable per se. See Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); People v. Gonzalez, 39 N.Y.2d 122, 127, 347 N.E.2d 575, 579,
383 N.Y.S.2d 215, 219 (1976); People v. Kreichman, 37 N.Y.2d 693, 697, 339 N.E.2d 182, 186,
376 N.Y.S.2d 497, 502 (1975); People v. Bennett, 47 App. Div. 2d 322, 325, 366 N.Y.S.2d 639,
642 (1st Dep't 1975). In exceptional circumstances, however, warrantless searches have been
approved. See, e.g., Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967) (search of escape route during
"hot pursuit"); People v. Erwin, 42 N.Y.2d 1064, 369 N.E.2d 1170, 399 N.Y.S.2d 637 (1977)
(search incidental to lawful arrest); People v. Prochilo, 41 N.Y.2d 759, 363 N.E.2d 1380, 395
N.Y.S.2d 635 (1977) (search for dangerous weapons); People v. Vaccaro, 39 N.Y.2d 468, 348
N.E.2d 886, 384 N.Y.S.2d 411 (1976) (search under "exigent circumstances"); People v.
Mitchell, 39 N.Y.2d 173, 347 N.E.2d 607, 383 N.Y.S.2d 246, cert. denied, 426 U.S. 953 (1976)
(search of premises in "emergency" situation); People v. Di Stefano, 38 N.Y.2d 640, 345
N.E.2d 548, 382 N.Y.S.2d 5 (1976) (search revealing evidence in "plain view"); People v.
Kreichman, 37 N.Y.2d 693, 339 N.E.2d 182, 376 N.Y.S.2d 497 (1975) (automobile searches);
People v. Esposito, 37 N.Y.2d 156, 332 N.E.2d 863, 371 N.Y.S.2d 681 (1975) (searches by
government border patrol); People v. Pittmen, 14 N.Y.2d 885, 200 N.E.2d 774, 252 N.Y.S.2d
89 (1964) (mem.) (seizure of abandoned property).
19781
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where warrants are not required.'87 In addition, the Payton majority
concluded that it is reasonable to permit entries for warrantless
arrests based upon "probable cause" since the high public interest
in the apprehension of criminals outweighs the privacy interest of
the individual suspect. a8
"I The Court noted that:
[i]n view of the minimal intrusion on the elements of privacy of the home which
results from entry on the premises for making an arrest (as compared with the gross
intrusion which attends the arrest itself), we perceive no sufficient reason for distin-
guishing between an arrest in a public place and an arrest in a residence.
45 N.Y.2d at 310, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400.
Im Id. at 311, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 400. Judge Jones noted that warrantless
entries to apprehend felons generally are accepted in English common law and have been
authorized by statute in New York since 1881. Id. at 311, 380 N.E.2d at 229, 408 N.Y.S.2d at
400 (citing CHrrTY, CRIMINAL LAW 22-23 (3d Am. ed. 1836)); 2 HALE, HISTORIA PLACITORUM
CORONAE, HISTORY OF PLEAS OF CROWN 92 (1st Am. ed. 1847)); see CPL § 140.15 (1971). In
addition, the Payton majority observed that several other jurisdictions have enacted similar
legislation. 45 N.Y.2d at 312 & n.4, 380 N.E.2d at 230 & n.4, 401 N.Y.S.2d at 401 & n.4 (citing
A.L.I., MODEL OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURE, COMMENTARY, App. XI (1975)); see, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 844 (Deering 1971); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 901.19(1) (West 1973); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-1-19-6 (Burns 1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 755.9 (West 1950); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.880
(1972). See also A.L.I., MODEL CODE OF PRE-ARRAIGNMENT PROCEDURES § 120.6[1] (1975).
The Court also upheld the lower court's use of the inevitable discovery doctrine to permit
testimony at defendant Payton's trial from a gun store owner who had been located through
an illegally obtained sales receipt. See note 179 supra. Significantly, the majority noted that
"inevitable" discovery does not mean that the evidence would certainly have been discovered
without the aid of unlawfully secured information. 45 N.Y.2d at 313, 380 N.E.2d at 230-31,
408 N.Y.S.2d at 402. Instead, the Court stated the doctrine requires the prosecutor to show a
"very high degree of probability that the evidence in question would have been obtained
independently of the tainted source." Id., 380 N.E.2d at 231, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 402. Applying
this standard to the facts in Payton, Judge Jones found that the prosecution had met this
burden by demonstrating that it was normal police procedure to contact the U.S. Treasury
Department, which has a list of all gun shops, in an effort to find the purchaser of a weapon
used in a crime. Since the witness who testified in the Payton trial was listed in the federal
registry, Judge Jones concluded that the police would have located him even if they had never
found the sales receipt in the defendant's apartment. Id. at 313-14, 380 N.E.2d at 231, 408
N.Y.S.2d at 402. Judge Wachtler, in a separate dissenting opinion, criticized the majority's
conclusion, noting that it was unlikely the police would have found the gun dealer without
the "tainted" receipt. 45 N.Y.2d at 316-17, 380 N.E.2d at 232-33, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 403-04
(Wachtler, J., dissenting). In Judge Wachtler's view, the inevitable discovery doctrine should
be limited to circumstances where "the police [have] only to look in the 'next most reasona-
ble place'" in order to find the evidence. Id. at 317, 380 N.E.2d at 233, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 404
(Wachtler, J., dissenting) (quoting People v. Fitzpatrick, 32 N.Y.2d 499, 507, 300 N.E.2d
139, 142, 346 N.Y.S.2d 793, 797 (1973)). Judge Wachtler was particularly concerned that,
under the majority's "high probability" standard, the police would always "be able to show
that they could have obtained the evidence lawfully by employing some other technique, no
matter how hypothetical." Id. at 317, 380 N.E.2d at 233, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 404 (Wachtler, J.,
dissenting). In another dissenting opinion, Judge Fuchsberg expressed similar dissatisfaction
with the majority's expansive interpretation of the "inevitable discovery" doctrine. 45 N.Y.2d
at 318, 380 N.E.2d at 234, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 405 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting). Arguing that the
diluted standard articulated by the majority makes "sidestepping of constitutional safe-
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Dissenting in one of three separate opinions, Judge Cooke ob-
jected to the majority's use of a dual standard to evaluate the pro-
priety of warrantless arrests and warrantless searches.'89 Reasoning
that the fourth amendment prohibits all unreasonable governmen-
tal intrusions upon the privacy of the home, Judge Cooke contended
that the entries made for the purpose of seizing a suspect's person
should be subject to the same constitutional safeguards that govern
entries made for the search and seizure of property.90 To require
neither a warrant nor exigent circumstances as predicate for an in-
home arrest, in Judge Cooke's view, was tantamount to "read[ing]
the Fourth Amendment out of the Constitution."''
It is submitted that the Payton majority's approval of warrant-
less entries represents a serious erosion of the right of privacy guar-
anteed by the Constitution. In the context of searches, it has been
consistently held that, absent exigency,' 2 the prior approval of a
detached magistrate is necessary to protect the privacy rights of
individuals from invasion by overzealous law enforcement offi-
cials.9 3 In light of this presumption in favor of warrants, there ap-
guards . . . all too easy," Judge Fuchsberg would have required the prosecutor to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that the evidence would have been uncovered in a lawful manner.
Id. at 319, 380 N.E.2d at 234, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 405 (Fuchsberg, J., dissenting).
"' 45 N.Y.2d at 319-20, 380 N.E.2d at 234-35, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 406 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
,, Id. at 321, 380 N.E.2d at 235-36, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 407 (Cooke, J., dissenting). Judge
Cooke stated that the majority's view "accorded an individual's bare possessions a greater
quantum of protection than his very person, reviving the values of an era in which property
interests were exalted over personal liberties." Id. at 320, 380 N.E.2d at 235, 408 N.Y.S.2d at
406 (Cooke, J., dissenting).
"I Id. at 321, 380 N.E.2d at 236, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 407 (Cooke, J., dissenting). Judge Cooke
also argued that requiring a warrant in the absence of exigent circumstances would not
unduly hamper law enforcement. Id. at 323, 380 N.E.2d at 237, 408 N.Y.S.2d at 408 (Cooke,
J., dissenting); cf. People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77, 82, 315 N.E.2d 792, 795, 358 N.Y.S.2d
743, 746 (1974) (inconvenience to the police is not sufficient reason to ignore the warrant
requirement).
" Most of the judicially-created exceptions to the general rule requiring warrants prior
to police searches are based upon the presence of "exigent" circumstances which preclude
the possibility of obtaining a warrant. See note 188 supra.
" See, e.g., Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 112-13 (1975) (quoting Johnson v. United
States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948)); McDonald v. United States, 335 U.S: 451 (1948); People
v. Clements, 37 N.Y.2d 675, 339 N.E.2d 170, 376 N.Y.S.2d 480 (1975). In Johnson, the
Supreme Court stated:
The point of the Fourth Amendment. . .-. is not that it denies law enforcement
the support of the usual inferences which reasonable men draw from evidence. Its
protection consists in requiring that those inferences be drawn by a neutral and
detached magistrate instead of being judged by the officer engaged in the often
competitive enterprise of ferreting out crime. Any assumption that evidence suffi-
cient to support a magistrate's disinterested determination to issue a search war-
rant will justify the officers in making a search without a warrant would reduce the
1978]
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pears to be no justification for permitting a policeman's opinion of
what constitutes probable cause to be the sole determining factor
when the entry is made for seizing a person rather than conducting
a search. 94 Moreover, in articulating a dual standard, the Payton
majority appears to have overlooked the critical relationship be-
tween arrests and searches. 5  In addition to a lawful arrest serving
as a predicate for a warrantless search of the suspect's "grab
area,"'' 5 the police may seize any evidence or contraband in plain
view once they are lawfully on the premises. "7 Thus, the practical
effect of the Payton rule is that if the police have probable cause to
arrest a suspect, they may enter his home and conduct a limited
search without having to secure the approval of a "detached magis-
trate."
This result is particularly troublesome when the arrest is for a
possessory crime involving narcotics or illegal weapons.9 8 In such
cases, knowledge that the suspect had contraband in his home
would not alone be sufficient to permit police to enter and search
Amendment to a nullity and leave the people's homes secure only in the discretion
of police officers.
Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10, 13-14 (1948).
"I The Supreme Court has observed:
It is not the breaking of his doors and the rummaging of his drawers that constitutes
the essence of the offense; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal
security, personal liberty and private property, where that right has never been
forfeited by his conviction of some public offense ....
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 630 (1886).
"I While the arrest itself has little legal significance for the criminal defendant, it serves
as a focal point for many of his constitutional rights. Under the exclusionary rule, evidence
obtained incident to an unlawful arrest may not be used against the defendant. People v.
Cantor, 36 N.Y.2d 106, 324 N.E.2d 872, 365 N.Y.S.2d 509 (1975); see Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643, 655-56 (1961). In addition, post-arrest statements made by the suspect without knowl-
edge of his constitutional rights generally are suppressed. E.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966); People v. Gary, 31 N.Y.2d 68, 286 N.E.2d 263, 334 N.Y.S.2d 883 (1972). The
Supreme Court, however, consistently has held that an "illegal arrest or detention does not
void a subsequent conviction." Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975); see Frisbie v.
Collins, 342 U.S. 519 (1952); Ker v. Illinois, 119 U.S. 436 (1886).
" E.g., Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969); People v. Weintraub, 35 N.Y.2d 351,
320 N.E.2d 636, 361 N.Y.S.2d 897 (1974); People v. Lewis, 26 N.Y.2d 547, 260 N.E.2d 538,
311 N.Y.S.2d 905 (1970). In Chimel, the Court defined the "grab area" as the "area 'within
[the suspect's] immediate control'-construing that phrase to mean the area from within
which he might gain possession of a weapon or destructible evidence." 395 U.S. at 763.
,17 E.g., Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1967); People v. Boone, 41 App. Div. 2d
783, 341 N.Y.S.2d 41 (3d Dep't 1973) (mem.); People v. Velez, 88 Misc. 2d 378, 388 N.Y.S.2d
519 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1976).
"I There are a number of possessory crimes which rise to the level of felonies. E.g., N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 220.06, .09, .12, .16, .18, .21 (McKinney Supp. 1978-1979) (possession of drugs);
id. § 221.20 (possession of marihauna); id. §§ 265.02-.04 (possession of a dangerous weapon).
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without a warrant. 9 Under Payton, however, the police can circum-
vent the search warrant requirement by predicating a warrantless
entry on "probable cause" to arrest for possession of contraband,
and, once inside the home, may conduct a limited search and seize
incriminating evidence in plain view or within the suspect's "grab
area. ' 'Oe Since the Payton decision increases the number of situa-
tions in which the police may conduct a warrantless search of pri-
vate premises, it appears inconsistent with prior cases holding war-
rantless searches "reasonable" only when conducted under exigent
circumstances."1 In this respect, the Payton decision raises serious




Gen. Mun. Law § 50-e: Liberalized notice of claim requirements
applicable to claims that accrued within I year of the amendment's
effective date
Where a notice of claim is mandated by statute2° as a condition
"I People v. Sciacca, 57 App. Div. 2d 846, 393 N.Y.S.2d 999 (2d Dep't 1977); People v.
Schwab, 52 App. Div. 2d 732, 382 N.Y.S.2d 158 (4th Dep't 1976) (mem.); People v. Chestnut,
43 App. Div. 2d 260, 351 N.Y.S.2d 26 (3d Dep't 1974), aff'd mem., 36 N.Y.2d 971, 335 N.E.2d
865, 373 N.Y.S.2d 564 (1975); People v. Pits, 84 Misc. 2d 708, 377 N.Y.S.2d 407 (Sup. Ct.
N.Y. County 1975).
no See notes 196-197 supra. The Payton decision raises an additional analytical problem
when applied in the context of warrantless entries to arrest for possessory crimes. In such
instances, the police would be on the premises lawfully, since they have probable cause to
believe that the suspect has committed a felony by possessing contraband. Under the "plain
view" doctrine, the police ordinarily would be permitted to seize any immediately visible
evidence. See People v. Jackson, 41 N.Y.2d 146, 150, 359 N.E.2d 677, 681, 391 N.Y.S.2d 82,
85 (1976). The courts have consistently suppressed evidence found in "plain view," however,
when its discovery was not entirely inadvertent or unexpected. E.g., People v. Spinelli, 35
N.Y.2d 77, 315 N.E.2d 792, 358 N.Y.S.2d 743 (1974). It is submitted that when the police
enter under Payton to arrest for a possessory crime, their "reasonable" belief that the suspect
possesses such contraband would negate the element of "inadvertence." Thus, although this
contraband may have been found in plain view, it logically should be suppressed.
21 See notes 171 & 186 supra. The Court of Appeals has noted that "where there is 'ample
time for the law enforcement officials to secure a warrant' the warrantless seizure of evidence,
even if it is in plain view, is unreasonable." People v. Jackson, 41 N.Y.2d 146, 150,359 N.E.2d
677, 681, 391 N.Y.S.2d 82, 85 (1976) (citing People v. Spinelli, 35 N.Y.2d 77, 81, 315 N.E.2d
792, 795, 358 N.Y.S.2d 743, 747 (1974)).
2 See note 171 and accompanying text supra. In view of the potential constitutional and
analytical problems inherent in the Payton decision, it is hoped that the lower courts will
scrutinize warrantless arrests carefully before according them legal effect.
m The purpose of notice of claim statutes is to prevent fraud and permit prompt and
